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Abstract 
 
Target firms in Australian takeovers are required to obtain an independent assessment 
of the offer price in situations where the Corporations Law considers the bidder has a 
superior bargaining position.  The intention of this requirement is to protect target 
shareholders from being offered a lower takeover premium.  The only empirical study 
of expert reports, Eddey (1993), is consistent with expert reports achieving their 
purpose, as the results indicate no difference in target firm premiums in offers with 
and without an expert report.  Eddey also reports that a revision in offer price is more 
likely where an expert indicates the bid is “not fair and reasonable.” 
 
Using all takeovers from 1990 to 2000, this thesis aims to re-examine and 
substantially extend the findings in Eddey.  As the sample includes all bids, 
irrespective of the form of payment consideration, the thesis will assess whether the 
results in Eddey can be extrapolated from cash-based bids to all takeover bids.  In 
addition, the analysis will extend Eddey’s results by investigating whether expert 
reports result in a higher probability of a revision in offer price relative to takeovers 
without an expert report. 
 
This study also investigates the impact of the expert report on bidder announcement 
abnormal returns and examines the returns to both bidders and targets when the expert 
report is released.  This will add to the limited current knowledge on the impact of 
expert reports on the capital market. 
 
 xii
This thesis also tests the validity of public criticisms of expert independence.  Firstly, 
experts have been publicly criticised on the basis that they are not independent from 
the target firm.  It has been suggested that such experts will be more likely to provide 
an opinion that agrees with the recommendation of target directors.  Secondly, it has 
been alleged that experts who are also the target auditor provide their reports at a 
lower fee by cross-subsidising the reports’ preparation from other fees received from 
the client.  The concern with this practice is that these reports may be of lower quality.  
This criticism is tested by developing an expert fee model.  This fee model is then 
used to assess whether, similar to evidence in the auditing field, ‘quality’ experts earn 
a fee premium. 
 
The results indicate that the need for an expert report does not affect bidder abnormal 
returns at either the announcement of the takeover or release of the expert report.  On 
the other hand, target shareholders earn significantly lower abnormal returns at the 
announcement of a bid where an expert report is required.  This result is inconsistent 
with Eddey (1993) and raises doubt over whether experts prevent bidders from using 
their superior bargaining position to offer target shareholders a lower premium.  
Consistent with Eddey, the probability of an alteration in offer price is greater where 
an adverse expert opinion is given.  The results also show that the presence of an 
expert increases the likelihood of a bid revision relative to takeovers in general. 
 
Target abnormal returns on the release of an expert report are positive and significant, 
irrespective of the type of expert opinion.  This result however, is sensitive to any 
association between the author of the report and the target.  In the case that an expert 
discloses any prior or current business dealings with the target, abnormal returns are 
 xiii
insignificant.  The conclusion from this finding is that the market perceives expert 
reports prepared by an associate of the target as lacking credibility.  In light of this 
lack of information content it is recommended corporate regulators review those 
experts permitted to prepare reports. 
 
Contrary to the published criticisms, experts who have business dealings with the 
target are just as likely as other experts to provide an opinion that agrees with the 
recommendation of directors.  The tests of a fee reduction by experts associated to the 
target indicate significant lower fees where the expert is the target auditor.  Further 
analysis shows this result is only significant where the auditor is also a non-Big 6/5 
firm.  These auditors are also found to provide reports that are significantly shorter 
than other experts, suggesting the cut in fee is achieved by reducing the amount of 
effort. 
 
The results also find that the top two experts, Grant Samuels and Associates and Price 
Waterhouse Coopers, earn a fee premium over other experts.  The finding of a fee 
premium for a large accounting firm indicates that such firms may receive a premium 
for both auditing and non-audit services. 
